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INTRODUCTION

The laudable goals of strict liability' have proven to be ar* B.S., Boston University (1972);J.D. (cum laude), New York Law School (1975).
Partner in Short Hills, NewJersey firm of Budd, Larner, Gross, Picillo, Rosenbaum,
Greenberg & Sade. I would like to thank Michele Brown for her invaluable assistance with this article.
I The purpose of strict liability as stated in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A comment c (1965) is:
[T]he justification for .. .strict liability has been said to be that the
seller, by marketing his product for use and consumption, has undertaken and assumed a special responsibility toward any member of the
consuming public who may be injured by it; that the public has the right
to and does expect, in the case of products which it needs and for which
it is forced to rely upon the seller, that reputable sellers will stand behind their goods; that public policy demands that the burden of accidental injuries caused by products intended for consumption be placed
upon those who market them, and be treated as a cost of production
against which liability insurance can be obtained; and that the consumer
of such products is entitled to the maximum of protection at the hands
of someone, and the proper persons to afford it are those who market
the products.
Id.
See also Keeton, Mlanufacturer'sLiability: The Aleaning of "Defect' in the Alan ufacture
and Design of Products, 20 SYRACUSE L. REV. 559, 570-71 (1969) (risk of improperly
manufactured product should be allocated to maker) [hereinafter Keeton, Alamfac-
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ticulated far more easily than achieved. Attempts to develop a
strict liability test flexible enough to accommodate all types of
products and all kinds of defects have resulted in confusion and
inconsistency. Courts have failed to reach a consensus on the
turer's Liability: The Meaning of Defect]; Keeton, Products Liability-Some Observations
About Allocation of Risks, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1329, 1333 (1966) (one reason for strict
liability is reduction of incidence of harm resulting from unfit and unsafe products)
[hereinafter Keeton, Products Liability-Some Observations]; Traynor, The Ways and
Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363, 366 (1965)
(strict liability provides incentive for producers to make safer products) [hereinafter
Traynor, The Ways and MeanIngs].
Professor John W. Wade has stated the purpose of strict liability as follows:
The idea is that the loss should not be allowed to remain with the injured party on whom it fortuitously fell, but should be transferred to the
manufacturer, who, by pricing his product, can spread it among all consumers. The extent to which a manufacturer may be free to "spread the
risk" created by his product can be the subject of some debate. A different way of expressing essentially the same idea is to say that the activity
of making the particular product should pay its own way, that the enterprise should bear the liability.
Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liabilityfor Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 826 (1973)
[hereinafter Wade, Nature of Strict Tort Liability]. With regard to the public's awareness of the inherent danger, Professor Wade noted that if a product's danger is so
great, "it ought not.., be marketed at all, despite the obviousness of the danger."
Id. at 840-41. The New Jersey Supreme Court has consistently expressed its concern for the protection of the consumer through the allocation of risk of injury. In
Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 205, 447 A.2d 539, 547
(1982), the court noted that:
One of the most important arguments generally advanced for imposing
strict liability is that the manufacturers and distributors of defective
products can best allocate the costs of the injuries resulting from those
products. The premise is that the price of a product should reflect all of
its costs, including the cost of injuries caused by the product. This can
best be accomplished by imposing liability on the manufacturers and
distributors. Those persons can insure against liability and incorporate
the cost of the insurance in the price of the product. In this way, the
costs of the product will be borne by those who profit from it.
Id. at 205, 447 A.2d at 547. See also Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chem. Corp., 91
N.J. 386, 398, 451 A.2d 179, 185 (1982) (noting that "it is in the public interest to
motivate individuals in the context of commercial enterprise to invest in safety.")
(citing Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 207, 447 A.2d 539,
549 (1982)); Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc., 87 N.J. 229, 238 n.1, 432 A.2d
925, 930 n.1 (1981) (stating that "[t]he theory is that only safe products should be
marketed-a safe product being one whose utility outweighs its inherent risk, provided that risk has been reduced to the greatest extent possible consistent with the
product's continued utility."); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J.
150, 173, 406 A.2d 140, 151 (1979) (noting that strict liability law attempts "to
minimize the costs of accidents and to consider who should bear those costs.");
Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 65, 207 A.2d 305, 312 (1965)
(observing that "[t]he purpose of [strict] liability is to insure that the cost of injuries
• . . resulting from defective products, is borne by the makers of the products... rather than the injured or damaged persons who ordinarily are powerless to
protect themselves.").
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appropriate standards to be used in product liability suits. 2 Nevertheless, many of the tests that have been adopted have been
adequate in cases involving manufacturing flaws or simple design
defects. When confronted with unavoidably unsafe products,
however, the deficiencies in these various tests become manifest
and the intent of strict liability law is frustrated.
New Jersey courts have undertaken a step-by-step approach
to effectuate the aims of strict liability, and, through their adoption of a risk-utility analysis,' have produced the most workable
analytical framework for determining when liability should be imposed. While stating that this standard applies to all products,
including unavoidably unsafe ones, the courts have limited its application to pharmaceutical and other products whose benefits
were presumed to outweigh their risks. 4 Only recently have the
trial courts been called upon to decide the suitability of the risk
2 See Cippolone v. Liggett Group, 649 F. Supp. 664 (D.N.J. 1986), cert. denied,
107 S. Ct. 907 (1987) (applying risk utility analysis to cigarette litigation case);
Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 216 N.J. Super. 347, 523 A.2d 712 (Law Div.
1986) (applying risk utility analysis to cigarette litigation case); but cf. Patterson v.
Gesellschaft, 608 F. Supp. 1206 (N.D. Tex. 1985) (rejecting risk utility analysis in
hand gun litigation). See infra notes 143-168 and accompanying text for a more
detailed discussion of these cases.
3 The risk-utility analysis is a common law doctrine which was originally suggested and identified by Professor W. Page Keeton and Dean John Wade, two leading authorities in the field of tort law. See Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of
Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30, 38 (1973) [hereinafter Keeton, Meaning of Defect]; Wade,
Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 15 (1965). Keeton and Wade independently proposed a liability theory whereby the fitness or danger of the product
would be determined by the condition of the product as marketed. Holford, The
Limits of StrictLiability for Product Design and Manufacture, 52 TEX. L. REV. 81, 92
(1973). Dean Wade suggested that a product is "not reasonably safe" or "not duly
safe" if the magnitude of the risk created by the dangerous condition of the product
outweighs the social utility attained by marketing the product in this fashion.
Wade, Nature of Strict Tort Liability, supra note 1, at 833, 835; see also, Whitehead v. St.
Joe Lead Co., 729 F.2d 238, 246 (3d Cir. 1984) (weighing "utility of marketing
lead.. .without warning against the risks to foreseeable users of lead .. ").Professor Keeton's formulation of the risk-utility test would render a product unreasonably dangerous "if a reasonable person would conclude that the magnitude of the
scientifically perceivable danger as it isproved to be at the time of the trial outweighed
the benefits of the way the product was so designed and marketed." Keeton, Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30, 38 (1973) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). "The New Jersey Supreme Court adopted the Wade-Keeton [risk utility]
formulation in Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 76 N.J. 152, 153, 386 A.2d 816
(1978)." Whitehead v. St. Joe Lead Co., Inc., 729 F.2d 238, 245 (1984).
4 See, e.g., Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 446 n.5, 479 A.2d 374,
383 n.5 (1984) (noting that no claim was made that " 'the standard to measure [a
pharmaceutical product] reflects a policy judgment that [the product is] so dangerous that [it] create[s] a risk of harm outweighing [its] usefulness.' " (quoting
O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 N.J. 169, 181, 463 A.2d 298, 304 (1983)).
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utility analysis to the unavoidably unsafe product which, when
used as intended, results in greater harm than good.5 By applying this analysis to such a product, the courts can take the next
logical step in the evolution of products liability law and can conform to contemporary reality in the marketplace.
II.
A.

EVOLUTION OF THE RISK UTILITY ANALYSIS

Backdrop

To understand the application of risk utility analysis to cases
involving unavoidably unsafe products, a review of the development of the law of strict products liability is necessary. 6 In response to changing social values and the growing complexity of
new products rapidly being introduced into the marketplace,
courts and commentators began to recognize that new legal safeguards were needed to achieve the appropriate balance between
the interests of the commercial world and the protection of the
consuming public.7 A heightened concern developed that con5 See, e.g., Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 216 N.J. Super. 347, 357-58,
523 A.2d 712, 717-18 (Law Div. 1986) (stating plaintiff's claim that tobacco manufacturers should be strictly liable in tort because their products are unavoidably
unsafe and that the risks attendant to their use outweigh their utility); Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, 649 F.2d 664, 669 (D.N.J. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 907 (1987)
(attempting to apply risk utility analysis to unavoidably unsafe products). See infra
notes 143-52 and accompanying text for a more detailed discussion of these cases.
6 See Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE
L.J. 1099 (1960) (reviewing history of strict liability); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel
(Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966) (recounting the historical development of strict liability); see also Heavner v. Uniroyal Inc., 63 N.J. 130,
146-52, 305 A.2d 412, 421-24 (1973) (tracing development of strict liability law in
New Jersey).
7 See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897,
901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963) (stating that purpose of strict liability for manufacturers was to impose liability for cost of injuries resulting from defective products on manufacturer who put product into market rather than on injured person
who is powerless to protect himself); Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J.
52, 64, 207 A.2d 305, 311 (1965) (strict liability was developed by courts as a stable
principle of law that arose "from the reality of the relationship between manufacturers of products and the consuming public to whom the products are offered for
sale"); Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 340, 298 N.E.2d 622, 627, 345 N.Y.S.2d
461, 468 (1973) (noting that advances in technologies have made consumer products so sophisticated that consumers cannot understand how they operate or recognize dangers or defects present in their manufacture or design).
In addition to courts, legal commentators began recognizing the need for consumer protection. Dean Keeton noted that:
The scientific and technological revolution through which our society is
proceeding is accompanied by vast changes in existing products as well
as a proliferation of new products, notably with respect to drugs, cosmetics, and other chemical products. For example, it has been noted
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sumers, injured as a result of the use of certain products, were
unfairly restricted in their ability to recover damages for such injuries. 8 This awareness became the genesis of strict liability law.9
Courts and legal scholars articulated a number of philosophical rationales for imposing this new form of liability on manufacturers.' ° Among these were risk spreading, cost avoidance,
difficulties in proof of negligence, availability of insurance, and
the hope that the imposition of such liability would provide an
incentive for the development of safer products." Attempts to
develop strict liability law and theory, however, produced a tortuous path of confusing and contradictory judicial opinions and
legal commentaries.' 2
that three fourths of the prescriptions written by doctors in the United
States today are for drugs and vaccines which were unknown in 1950.
Keeton, Products Liability-Some Observations,supra note 1, at 1329. Dean Keeton also
observed that the increase in occurrence "of unintended harm occurring in the
course of, or as a consequence of, the use of the products, together with the enhanced social concern for the victims of our modern devices, is bringing about a
reexamination of the principles formerly utilized by the courts for shifting losses."
Id. at 1329-30.
8 See Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 340, 298 N.E.2d 622, 627, 345 N.Y.S.2d
461, 468 (1973).
9 As early as 1944, in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 150 P.2d
436 (1944),Justice Traynor advocated the imposition of absolute liability on manufacturers for placing defective products that cause injury in the stream of commerce
for public policy reasons. Id. at 461, 150 P.2d at 440 (Traynor, J., concurring).
Justice Traynor stated that "the manufacturer's negligence should no longer be
singled out as the basis of a 1ilaintiff's right to recover in cases like the present one"
where a coke bottle explodes. Id.
In 1973, Dean Wade commented that:
The time has now come to be forthright in using a tort way of thinking
and tort terminology. There are several ways of doing it, and it is not
difficult. The simplest and easiest way, it would seem, is to assume that
the defendant knew of the dangerous condition of the product and ask
whether he was then negligent in putting it on the market or supplying it
to someone else. In other words, the scienter is supplied as a matter of
law, and there is no need for the plaintiff to prove its existence as a
matter of fact. Once given this notice of the dangerous condition of the
chattel, the question then becomes whether the defendant was negligent
to people who might be harmed by that condition if they came into contact with it or were in the vicinity of it. Another way of saying this is to
ask whether the magnitude of the risk created by the dangerous condition of the product was outweighed by the social utility attained by putting it out in this fashion.
Wade, Nature of Strict Tort Liability, supra note 1, at 834-35.
10 See supra notes 8, 9 (for a discussion of these reasons).
II See Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 204-07, 477 A.2d
539, 547-48 (1982); Wade, Nature of Strict Tort Liability, supra note 1, at 826.
12 See Wade, Nature of Strict Tort Liability, supra note 1, at 825-38 (discussing how
and why strict liability should be applied to defective products); Keeton, Manufac-

628

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17:623

Beginning in such cases as Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc. , 13 and Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. ,14 the judiciary began to assume responsibility for creating standards for the imposition of strict liability. 5 Contemporaneous with these efforts
was a national trend towards the development of strict liability
doctrine, manifested by the American Law Institute (ALI) in its
promulgation of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A. 16 This
section was designed to be the standard by which manufacturers
of products could be held strictly liable in tort. 7 As evidenced
by a review of the ALI proceedings, however, there were significant difficulties and disagreements in attempting to develop criteria for the imposition of strict liability. 8 Section 402A and its
turer's Liability: The Meaning of Defect, supra note 1, at 559-75 (discussing liability for
manufacturers of defective products); Keeton, Products Liability-Some Observations,
supra note 1, at 1329-31 (discussing allocation of risk between consumer and manufacturer); Traynor, The Ways and Meanings, supra note 1, at 363-76 (discussing merits
of applying strict liability to manufacturers as opposed to other theories of liability);
Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5 (1965) (discussing development of strict liability for products and the future direction of this line of thinking).
See also infra notes 33-79 and accompanying text (for a discussion of the development of strict liability law in New Jersey).
13 32 NJ. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
14 59 Cal.2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.Rptr. 697 (1963).
15 See id. at 64, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701. The Greenman court noted
that: "a manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect
that causes injury to a human being." Id. at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at
700. See also infra note 34 for a discussion of the law espoused in Henningsen.
16 Section 402A of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS provides that:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer,
or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
17 See id. comment a.
18 See Page, Generic Product Risks: The Case Against Comment k and for Strict Tort
Liability, 58 N.Y.U.L. REV. 853 (1983) [hereinafter Page, Generic Product Risks].
Dean Prosser drafted the comment [comment k] in response to a proposal at the 1961 ALl meeting that prescription drugs be specifically excluded from section 402A. The arguments and the discussion that
followed were notably unfocused. The motion under consideration
failed to distinguish between harm from adverse reactions and other
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accompanying comments failed to provide a workable formula
for determining when strict liability should be imposed.' 9 This
shortcoming produced numerous scholarly articles advocating
various standards for determining when a product should be considered defective.2" Dean John Wade emerged as a prominent
force in developing acceptable criteria to be employed in making
such a determination. 2 '
The concerns expressed by legal scholars regarding the deficiencies of § 402A were also recognized by the judiciary.2 2
kinds of drug-induced harm, such as that caused by improper formulation of toxic ingredients. Since no one could argue seriously that the
latter risks should escape strict liability, the failure to separate the two
categories muddled the debate.
Id. at 864-65 (footnotes omitted). See also Wade, Nature of Strict Tort Liability, supra
note 1, at 830-31 (for a recounting of ALI proceedings that resulted in substitution
of "defective condition unreasonably dangerous" for original "dangerous" language of section 402A).
19 See Wade, Nature of Strict Tort Liability, supra note 1, at 830. Referring to the
language of § 402A, Dean Wade stated that "[t]he Restatement uses two expressions [defective and unreasonably dangerous] which may seem redundant. They
might have been joined together with an 'or' rather than an 'and.' But they were
not and this has created some problems of its own." Id. In addition, Professor Page
commented that:
the Restatement's treatment of generic risks fall short on several counts.
The requirement of a 'defect' as a distinct element of strict liability was
inserted to serve a function already adequately addressed by the "unreasonably dangerous" test. The Restatement fails to make a clear distinction between known and unknown hazards, and never takes a forthright
position on which of these two types of hazards strict liability should
cover: either, neither or both.
Page, Generic Product Risks, supra note 18, at 871-72.
20 See Wade, Nature of Strict Tort Liability, supra note 1, at 828 n.12 for a comprehensive list of articles on the subject.
21 Dean Wade is credited with developing the first comprehensive list of factors
to be balanced in determining whether a product is unreasonably dangerous or not
duly safe. See id. at 837. Dean Keeton formulated a more restricted set of criteria to
be used in deciding if a product is defective, including balancing the usefulness of
the product, the manufacturer's ability to spread the risk, the user's expectation of
the product's performance, and the manufacturer's knowledge or ability to understand the nature of the defect and to have it eliminated. Keeton, Meaning of Defect,
supra note 3, at 37-38.
22 See Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140
(1979). In Suter, the court stated that:
Incorporation of the "defective condition unreasonably dangerous" language in the jury charge appears to impose a greater burden on plaintiff
than is warranted, for it seems to require that plaintiff not only establish
a defect but that in addition the condition created be unreasonably dangerous. It has been said inclusion of the phrase "unreasonably dangerous" in the Restatement formula is partially responsible for the
confusion currently existing in products liability law.
Id. at 174-75, 406 A.2d at 152 (citing U.S. Department of Commerce, Interagency
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Courts interpreting § 402A split over what constituted "a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user ' 2 3 and how
24
this language applied, if at all, to the determination of defect.
This schism 26resulted in the "consumer expectation ' 25 and the
"risk utility"

tests to determine liability. Jurisdictions adopting

the consumer expectation test followed more closely the precise
language of § 402A, and its accompanying comment i, which defines "unreasonably dangerous" as being more dangerous than
an ordinary consumer could reasonably expect. 2 7 Many jurisdicTask Force on Product Liability, Product Liability: 2 Final Report on the Legal Study 18
(1977)).
See also Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., Inc., 20 Cal.3d 413, 417, 573 P.2d 443, 446,
143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 228 (1978) (stating that § 402A's "unreasonably dangerous"
element should not be included in plaintiff's burden of proof in product liability
suit); Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal.3d 121, 123, 501 P.2d 1153, 1155, 104
Cal. Rptr. 433, 435 (1972) (rejecting apparent imposition of dual burden of establishing that product defect proximately caused injuries and that defect made product unreasonably dangerous).
23 RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS §

402A(1) (1965).

24 See Wade, Nature of Strict Tort Liability, supra note 1, at 829. Dean Wade observed that although the Restatement was accepted in Greenman v. Yuba Power
Prod., Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 29 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963), "the Supreme
Court of California has. . ., in the case of Cronin v.J.B.E. Olson Corp., held that there
is a difference between them ['defective' and 'unreasonably dangerous'], and that
the California position is that the plaintiff needs to prove only that the product was
defective, not that it was also unreasonably dangerous." Wade, Nature of Strict Liability, supra note 1, at 829 (footnotes omitted). See also Wade, On the Effect in Product
Liability of Knowledge Unavailable Prior to Marketing, 58 N.Y.U.L. REV. 734, 741-44
(1983) [hereinafter Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability] for a discussion of various
judicial interpretations of § 402A.
25 See Barker, 20 Cal.3d at 432, 573 P.2d at 455-56, 143 Cal.Rptr. at 237-38. The
Barker court stated that "a product may be found defective in design if the plaintiff
demonstrates that the product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer
would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner." Id.
26 See id. at 432, 573 P.2d at 456, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 238. In explaining the risk
utility analysis, the court noted that, alternatively, a product may "be found defective in design if the plaintiff demonstrates that the product's design proximately
caused his injury and the defendant fails to establish, in light of the relevant factors,
that, on balance, the benefits of the challenged design outweigh the risk of danger
inherent in such design." Id.
27 RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF TORTS

§ 402A comment i (1965).

Comment i

provides:
Unreasonably Dangerous. The rule stated in this Section applies only
where the defective condition of the product makes it unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer. Many products cannot possibly be
made entirely safe for all consumption, and any food or drug necessarily
involves some risk of harm, if only from overconsumption. Ordinary
sugar is a deadly poison to diabetics, and castor oil found use under
Mussolini as an instrument of torture. That is not what is meant by "unreasonably dangerous" in this Section. The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the
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tions, however, including New Jersey, were troubled by the
phrase "unreasonably dangerous," finding it confusing and unduly burdensome on the plaintiff attempting to establish liabilanalysis
ity. 28 These jurisdictions opted for the risk utility
29
thereof.
variation
some
or
Wade
proposed by Dean
Dean Wade suggested that the test for determining defectiveness was to inquire whether a reasonably prudent manufacturer would have marketed the product in the form it did, or, if it
had knowledge of the product's danger, whether it would have
marketed the product in an alternative form.3 0 He proposed the
ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics. Good whiskey is not
unreasonably dangerous merely because it will make some people
drunk, and is especially dangerous to alcoholics; but bad whiskey, containing a dangerous amount of fusel oil, is unreasonably dangerous.
Good tobacco is not unreasonably dangerous merely because the effects
of smoking maybe harmful; but tobacco containing something like marijuana may be unreasonably dangerous.
Id. See also Barker, 20 Cal.3d at 430, 573 P.2d at 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236 (1978)
(rejecting consumer expectation test as sole ground for imposing strict liability).
28 See Barker, 20 Cal.3d at 430, 573 P.2d at 454, 143 Cal.Rptr. at 236 (1978)
(rejecting consumer expectation test as sole ground for imposing strict liability);
Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc., 87 N.J. 229, 241, 432 A.2d 925, 931 (1981)
(where court noted that "we continue to adhere to the view that the language 'defective condition unreasonably dangerous' has the potential for misunderstanding,
it is not apt and should be rejected); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81
N.J. 150, 174-75, 406 A.2d 140, 152 (1979) (noting that "defective condition unreasonably dangerous" requires the plaintiff to establish both a defect and a condition unreasonably dangerous).
Dean Wade noted that:
[t]he two terms ["defective condition" and "unreasonably dangerous"]
are regarded as not entirely synonymous, and if it is either tautological
or requiring too much to insist that the product be both defective and
unreasonably dangerous, the question then arises as to which term is the
more appropriate. There are difficulties with either one alone, as an
analysis will show....
On the other hand, the term "unreasonably dangerous" raises difficulties of its own. It may suggest an idea like ultrahazardous, or abnormally dangerous, and thus give rise to the impression that the plaintiff
must prove that the product was unusually or extremely dangerous.
Wade, Nature of Strict Tort Liability, supra note 1, at 831-32.
29 Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'r Co., 76 N.J. 152, 173, 386 A.2d 816, 826
(1978), overruled in part, 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979). The court in Cepeda
observed that "[o]ur study of the decisions satisfies us that this risk-utility analysis
rationalizes what the great majority of the courts actually do in deciding design
defect cases where physical injury has proximately resulted from the defect. Several recent cases have expressly referred to and applied the stated analysis." Id.
(citations omitted). See also Birnbaum & Wrubel, State of the Art and Strict Product
Liability, TORT & INS. L.J., 30 (1985) (most jurisdictions have accepted risk utility
balancing test in deciding whether the product is defective).
30 Wade, Nature of Strict Tort Liability, supra note 1, at 839-40 (citation omitted).
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following elements to be considered in determining this issue of
defect; these elements have come to be known as the "risk-utility" or "Wade" factors:
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product-its
utility to the user and to the public as a whole.
(2) The safety aspects of the product-the likelihood
that it will cause injury and the probable seriousness of the
injury.
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would
meet the same need and not be as unsafe.
(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe
character of the product without impairing its usefulness or
making it too expensive to maintain its utility.
(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of
care in the use of the product.
(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product and their avoidability, because of general public knowledge of the obvious condition of the product,
or of the existence of suitable warnings or instructions.
(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of
spreading the loss by setting
the price of the product or carry31
ing liability insurance.
An examination of how the New Jersey courts incorporated and
modified this risk utility analysis is necessary to understand why it is
the standard by which the unavoidably unsafe product should be
scrutinized. It also provides the basis for identifying the role consumer knowledge and behavior may play in the imposition of strict
liability.
B.

Adoption of Risk Utility Analysis in New Jersey.
Although only fleetingly referred to by name,32 strict liability

Id. at 837-38.
See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 372, 161 A.2d 69, 77
(1960). The Henningsen court stated that:
The transcendent value of the legislation, [Uniform Sale of Goods Law],
particularly with respect to implied warranties, rests in the fact that obligations on the part of the seller were imposed by operation of law, and
did not depend for their existence upon express agreement of the parties. And of tremendous significance in a rapidly expanding commercial
society was the recognition of the right to recover damages on account
of personal injuries arising from a breach of warranty .... The particular
importance of their advance resides in the fact that under such circumstances strict liability is imposed upon the maker or seller of the product. Recovery of damages does not depend upon proof of negligence or
knowledge of the defect.
31
32
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began in New Jersey with the 1960 case of Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc..
In Henningsen, Justice Francis recognized an im-

plied warranty by a manufacturer that a product was suitable for
its intended purpose.34 Justice Francis concluded that a party
need not prove a manufacturer's negligence or knowledge of a
defect to recover damages. 3 5 The rationale for permitting 36
such
recovery was based on fundamental public policy concerns.
Five years later, in Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc. , the

New Jersey Supreme Court defined this implied warranty theory
as a hybrid form of action arising under both tort and contract
theories. 8 Justice Francis observed that the purpose of imposing
such liability was "to insure that the cost of injuries or damage
...resulting from defective products, is borne by the makers of
the products who put them in the channels of trade, rather than
by the injured or damaged
persons who ordinarily are powerless
39
to protect themselves."
Id. (citations omitted).
33 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
34 Id. at 384, 161 A.2d at 84. The Henningsen court held that "[u]nder modern
marketing conditions, when a manufacturer puts a new automobile in the stream of
trade and promotes its purchase by the public, an implied warranty that it is reasonably suitable for use as such accompanies it into the hands of the ultimate purchaser." Id.
35 Id. at 372, 161 A.2d at 77.
36 Id. at 404, 161 A.2d at 95. The Henningsen court noted that:
Public policy at a given time finds expression in the Constitution, the
statutory law and in judicial decisions. In the area of sale of goods, the
legislative will has imposed an implied warranty of merchantability as a
general incident of sale of an automobile by description. The warranty
does not depend upon the affirmative intention of the parties. It is a
child of the law; it annexes itself to the contract because of the very
nature of the transaction ....
The judicial process has recognized a right
to recover damages for personal injuries arising from a breach of that
warranty.
Id. (citations omitted).
37 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
38 Id. at 64, 207 A.2d at 311. Ordinarily, no contract exists between the ultimate
consumer of a product and its manufacturer. Id. In fact, as a public policy matter, a
duty has been imposed on manufacturers to such consumers irrespective of any
privity or contractual relationship. Id. "Such concept expressed in terms of breach
of implied warranty of fitness or merchantability bespeaks a sui generis cause of action. Its character is hybrid, having its commencement in contract and its termination in tort." Id.
39 Id. at 65, 207 A.2d at 312. In stating the purpose for its holding, the Santor
court stated that:
[I]n this developing field of the law, courts have necessarily been proceeding step by step in their search for a stable principle which can
stand on its own base as a permanent part of the substantive law. The
quest has found sound expression, we believe, in the doctrine of strict
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Having identified their goal, courts needed to provide more
definitive guidelines for the imposition of strict liability. In Schipper v. Levitt & Sons," the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized
that "even under implied warranty or strict liability principles,
the plaintiff's burden still remains of establishing to the jury's
satisfaction from all the circumstances that the design was unreasonably dangerous."'" By imposing the requirement that the
product be proven "unreasonably dangerous," the court appears
to have implicitly adopted the language of § 402A. 42
It was not until 1978, in Cepeda v. Cumberland Engineering
44
Co.,43 that the court expressly adopted the seven Wade factors
as the test for determining whether a product is defective. 45 The
court noted, however, that not all of the factors would necessarily
be applicable in all cases."6 The court went on to hold that, in
applying Dean Wade's test, the trial court must first perform a
risk utility analysis applying the relevant factors to decide
whether to preclude or impose liability as a matter of law. 47 In
cases in which liability is not determined as a matter of law, the
trial court must determine which of the seven factors should be
considered by the jury. 4" Although the supreme court adopted
Dean Wade's seven factors, the court did not exactly accept his
suggestion that the jury be charged that a product was defective
if a reasonable manufacturer would not have placed it on the
market. 9 Instead, the court substituted § 402A's "unreasonably
liability in tort. Such doctrine stems from the reality of the relationship
between manufacturers of products and the consuming public to whom
the products are offered for sale. . . It must be said, therefore, that
when the manufacturer presents his goods to the public for sale he accompanies them with a representation that they are suitable and safe for
the intended use.
Id. at 64-65, 207 A.2d at 311.
40 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
41 Id. at 96, 207 A.2d at 328.
42 See supra note 16 for text of § 402A.
43 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816 (1978), rev'd in part, 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140
(1979).
44 See supra note 31 and accompanying text (for a list of the seven Wade factors
used in determining the issue of "defect.").
45 Cepeda, 76 N.J. at 173-74, 386 A.2d at 826-27 (footnote omitted).
46 Id. at 174-75, 386 A.2d at 827.
47 Id. at 173, 386 A.2d at 826.
48 See id. at 174, 386 A.2d at 827 (emphasis added).
49 Id. Dean Wade suggested the following jury charge:
A [product] is not duly safe if it is so likely to be harmful to persons [or
property] that a reasonable prudent manufacturer [supplier], who had
actual knowledge of its harmful character would not place it on the market. It is not necessary to find that this defendant had knowledge of the
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dangerous" requirement for Dean Wade's proposed "not duly
safe" standard.5 °
One year later, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Suter v. San
Angelo Foundry & Machine Co., 5 ' affirmed the wisdom of the
Cepeda52 court's adoption of the risk utility analysis but specifically rejected § 402A's "unreasonably dangerous" criterion as
part of the jury charge.5 3 The court chose instead to define defect in terms of whether the product is "reasonably fit, suitable,
and safe for its intended or foreseeable purposes. . . . The
court rejected § 402A's language because of its potential for misunderstanding 55 and because it could be interpreted as placing
more emphasis on the manufacturer's conduct than on the nature of the product. 56 Thus, the court opined that § 402A imharmful character of the [product] in order to determine that it was duly
safe.
Id. (quoting Wade, Nature of Strict Tort Liability, supra note 1, at 839-40) (emphasis
added).
50 Id. at 174, 386 A.2d at 827. The court specifically stated that:
Subject to substituting the Section 402A language, "defective condition
unreasonably dangerous," for the Wade preferred "not duly safe," we
approve and adopt this instruction for incorporation into a charge in an
action against a manufacturer for strict liability in tort based upon the
design defect of a product. Such a charge would be usefully amplified
by the judge calling to the attention of the jury for their consideration
any of the Wade factors . . . going into the risk utility analysis for which
there is specific proof in the case and especial significance.
Id. at 174-75, 386 A.2d at 827 (footnote omitted).
51 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979).
52 See id. at 172, 386 A.2d at 151.
53 Id. at 176, 406 A.2d at 153.
54 Id. The Suter Court noted that:
Defining the strict liability principle in terms of a defect and an unreasonably dangerous condition does not advance an understanding of the
concept and will not assist a jury's comprehension of the issues which it
must resolve. Accordingly, the jury should be charged in terms of
whether the product was reasonably fit, suitable and safe for its intended
or foreseeable purposes when inserted by defendant into the stream of
commerce and, if not, whether as a result damage or injury was incurred
by the contemplated users or others who might reasonably be expected
to come into contact with it. This is not to say that the jury should not
receive additional instructions relative to the nature of the alleged defect. For example, a product may be unsafe because of inadequate instructions or, as in this case, the absence of safety features. The
instruction should be tailored to the factual situation to assist the jury in
performing its fact finding responsibility.
Id.
55 Id.; see also supra note 54 (for a discussion of the Suter court's holding on this
issue).
56 See Suter, 81 N.J. at 169, 170, 406 A.2d at 149, 153. It must be remembered
that when examining the risks and benefits, the focus must be on the product's use.
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properly increased the plaintiff's burden of proof.5 7
It was not until 1982 in Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products
Corp.,58 that the New Jersey Supreme Court clearly focused on
the risk utility analysis. 5 9 The court stated that the question of
defect depends upon a comparison of a product's risks and its
utility.6" In determining this issue, the court recommended a two
step test: (1) Does the product's utility outweigh its risks?; and
(2) If so, has the risk been reduced to the greatest extent possible
consistent with the product's utility?6"
The initial inquiry considers the product in the condition in
which it was actually marketed.6 2 The court reasoned that if the
product "caused more harm than good," then it was defective
and strict liability could be imposed for related injuries, without
requiring the plaintiff to prove the existence of an alternative
safer design. 6 3 In such a case, the second step of the analysis is
not reached.6 4 In addition, the court cautioned that even if the
product passes the risk utility test, the product can still be considered defective if it could have been marketed or made more
safely by virtue of some feature of its design, including instruc65
tions or warnings.
Shortly after its Beshada decision, the New Jersey Supreme
Court in O'Brien v. Muskin Corp.66 clarified that the risk utility
analysis applies as much to unavoidably unsafe products as it
does to improperly designed products.6 7 The court recognized
that some products, including some for which no safer design
exists, are of such little benefit while at the same time being so
dangerous, that strict liability should be imposed.68 The court
noted, however, that other unavoidably unsafe products may be
See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 283 (D.N.J. 1986). For example,
whether substantial taxes are levied on a particular product is irrelevant as is the
number of people employed in the industry producing the product in question. Id.
The focus is on the risk and benefit to the user, not to the manufacturer. Id.
57 Suter, 81 N.J. at 174-75. 406 A.2d at 152; see also supra note 22 (for a discussion
of this shift in burdens of proof).
58 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982).
59 See id. at 199-202, 447 A.2d at 544-45.
60 Id. at 199, 447 A.2d at 544.
61 Id. at 201, 447 A.2d at 545.
62

Id.

Id.
See
65 See
66 94
67 See
(i Id.
63

64

id.
id. at 201-02, 447 A.2d at 545 (footnote omitted).
N.J. 169, 463 A.2d 298 (1983).
id. at 183, 463 A.2d at 305.
at 184, 463 A.2d at 306.
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marketed without imposition of liability so long as they have great
social utility and are accompanied by adequate warnings. 69 Consistent with comment k to § 402A, 70 these warnings must provide
sufficient information relating the risks associated with the use of
the product so as to permit an informed consent by the user.7 '
The New Jersey Supreme Court's latest pronouncement on
risk utility is Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories.72 In Feldman, the de69

Id.

See id. at 183, 463 A.2d at 305 (emphasis added). The court stated that:
some products are unavoidably unsafe: the need for a product may be
great, but the existing state of human knowledge may not make it safe.
Restatement § 402A, comment k. With those products, the determination
of liability may be achieved more appropriately through an evaluation of
the adequacy of the warnings. In brief, risk-utility analysis is not a petrified, but a dynamic process. Where a particular product falls on the
risk-utility continuum will depend on the facts of each case. A toy that
poses undue risks to infants may be viewed differently from a therapeutic device that protects or prolongs life. As we proceed, as we must, on a
case-by-case basis, risk-utility analysis provides the flexibility necessary
for an appropriate adjustment of the interests of manufacturers, consumers, and the public.

70 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment k (1965). Comment k
provides that:
Unavoidably unsafe products. There are some products which, in the present state of human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe
for their intended and ordinary use. These are especially common in
the field of drugs. An outstanding example is the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of rabies, which not uncommonly leads to very serious
and damaging consequences when it is injected. Since the disease itself
invariably leads to a dreadful death, both the marketing and the use of
the vaccine are fully justified, notwithstanding the unavoidably high degree of risk which they involve. Such a product, properly prepared, and
accompanied by proper directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it
unreasonablydangerous. The same is true of many other drugs, vaccines,
and the like, many of which for this very reason cannot legally be sold
except to physicians, or under the prescription of a physician. It is also
true in particular of many new or experimental drugs as to which, because of lack of time and opportunity for sufficient medical experience,
there can be no assurance of safety, or perhaps even of purity of ingredients, but such experience as there is justifies the marketing and use of
the drug notwithstanding a medically recognizable risk. The seller of
such products, again with the qualification that they are properly prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given, where the situation
calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate consequences attending their use, merely because he has undertaken to supply the public with an apparently useful and desirable product, attended
with a known but apparently reasonable risk.
Id. (emphasis in original). I
71 See O'Brien, 94 N.J. at 183, 463 A.2d at 305. See also Note, Products Liabilit ,Strict Liability in Tort-State-of-the-Art Evidence Relevant to Risk-Utility Analysis in Design
Defect Cases, 15 SETON HALL L. REV. 120 (1984) (complete discussion of O'Brien).
72 97 N.J. 429, 479 A.2d 374 (1984).
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fendant urged that strict liability should not apply to certain unavoidably unsafe products 73 and that drug manufacturers should
be immunized from liability for the side effects produced by prescription drugs.7 ' Lederle based its contentions on comment k of
the Restatement's § 402A.75 In response, the court recognized
that comment k may provide a defense for manufacturers of certain unavoidably unsafe products, that is, products whose risks
are outweighed by their benefits. The court refused, however, to
hold the manufacturers immune from liability as a matter of
law. 76 The court also held that a "jury may be called upon to
balance the risk utility factors and decide whether the products
should fall within the immunized category. ' ' 77 Notably, no claim
had been made that the risks of the particular drug in question
outweighed its benefits.78 Nonetheless, the court declined to rule
that issue out of the case,7 0 thereby emphasizing the importance
of its applicability to unavoidably unsafe products.
The New Jersey Supreme Court has yet to consider a case in
which it is alleged that the use of an unavoidably unsafe product
results in greater risks than benefits. Although it has endorsed
the risk benefit test for determining whether such products are
defective, the court has yet to develop the specific mechanics of
the analysis and to explore its effect on the issue of comparative
fault.
III.

APPLICATION OF RISK UTILITY ANALYSIS IN

CASES

INVOLVING UNAVOIDABLY UNSAFE PRODUCTS

A.

Unavoidably Unsafe Products versus Other Defect Cases

It is important at the outset to note the existence of the different types of defect cases.80 One category of products liability
73 Id. at 446, 479 A.2d at 383.
74 Id. at 441, 446, 479 A.2d at 380, 383.
75 See id. at 441, 479 A.2d at 380.

See id. at 447, 479 A.2d at 383.
Id. at 444-45, 479 A.2d at 382 (citing O'Brien, 94 N.J. at 169, 463 A.2d at 298).
78 Id. at 446 n.5, 479 A.2d at 383 n.5 (citing O'Bien, 94 N.J. at 181, 463 A.2d at
304).
79 See id. at 446-49, 479 A.2d at 383-84.
8o See O'Brien, 94 N.J. at 180-81, 463 A.2d at 304. In Feldman, the court noted
that "[t]he defect may take one of three forms: manufacturing flaw, a design defect,
or an inadequate warning." Feldman, 97 N.J. at 449, 479 A.2d at 385 (citing
O'Brien). In Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc., 87 N.J. 229, 240-42, 432 A.2d 925,
930-32 (1981), the court referred to failure to warn cases as a type of design defect
case, that is, by describing the absence or inadequacy of a warning as a feature of its
76
77
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cases involves manufacturing defects. 8 Determining the existence of a manufacturing defect is elementary. The question is:
did the product perform as the manufacturer intended? 82 If, for
example, a soda bottle explodes when used as intended the product would be considered defective. Since, after the fact, the defect is obvious and unintended, there is no need to conduct a
detailed risk utility analysis utilizing the various Wade factors.8 3
Another category of cases involves design defects and is
comprised of three subcategories:
(1) products for which an alternative safer design exists; 84
(2) products that are dangerous but that may be used safely
in accordance with appropriate warnings or instructions; 85 and
design. The distinction is merely one of semantics since analysis of "defect" is
identical under either view.
Although Feldman articulated three categories of defects, Dean Wade explained
that:
The second, "defective design," involves a design that, technologically
and economically, may feasibly be made safer by eliminating or diminishing the danger in question. If the design cannot feasibly be made
safer, actionability depends on whether the danger is so great that the
product should not have been put on the market at all....
One way of diminishing a product danger generally available to the
manufacturer is to append a warning to the product. Warnings (and
instructions for use) are actually a part of the product design and properly should be viewed as one factor in determining whether the design is
duly safe. Thus, although "failure to warn" usually is treated as a separate basis for finding a product actionable, "failure to warn" cases may
properly be viewed as "defective design" cases.
Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability, supra note 24, at 740 (footnote omitted).
81 O'Brien, 94 N.J. at 181, 436 A.2d at 304 (1983):
For example, the injury-causing product may be measured against the
same product as manufactured according to the manufacturer's standards. If the particular product used by the plaintiff fails to conform to
those standards or other units of the same kind, it is defective. An apt
illustration is a mass-produced document that comes off the assembly
line missing a part. The question in those cases becomes whether the
product as produced by the manufacturer conformed to the product as
intended.
Id. (citations omitted).
82 Id.
83 See Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 76 N.J. 152, 170, 386 A.2d 816, 825
(1978), overruled in part, 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979). When dealing with "a
defect of a product in the sense of an abnormality unintended by the manufacturer,
there would appear to be primafacie liability for physical harm proximately resulting
from the defect to a user or consumer without any need for showing of unreasonable danger in any other sense." Id.
84 This category includes products whose design can be changed to make the
products safer. See Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406
A.2d 140 (1979) (discussing how addition of guard on metal sheet rolling machine
could have made machine safer).
85 This category includes products whose design probably cannot be changed to
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(3) products that are unavoidably unsafe; that is, those that
carry a risk of harm to consumers when used exactly as
intended. 6
All three types of products will be considered "defective" if their
risks outweigh their benefits.8 7 They may also be "defective," even
if their benefits outweigh their risks, in certain circumstances. 8
Products falling in the first two subcategories are defective when the
manufacturer fails to reduce the risk to the maximum extent possible by not designing the product more safely8 9 or by not providing
make them safe but, with the addition of instructions or warnings, will permit the
user to use the product without injury, e.g., warnings on solvents advising that they
are to be used in a well ventilated area. See Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J.
429, 450, 479 A.2d 374, 385 (1984) (stating that "failure-to-warn strict liability classification is similar to the improper design category... [and] that an inadequate
warning could constitute a design defect."); see also Keeton, Products Liability-Inadequacy of Information 48 TEX. L. REV. 398, 403 (1970) (stating that "[t]he question
whether a product was properly designed is inseparable from the question whether
adequate instructions are provided to insure safe usage.").
86 This category includes products that cannot be rendered safer through alternative designs or warnings. See Page, Generic Product Risks, supra note 18. Professor
Page has stated that "examples of generic, nondesign risks abound: adverse reactions to drugs and exposure to harmful chemicals; the risk of cancer from smoking
cigarettes; the risk of 'toxic shock' from using tampons; and the possibly deleterious effects of consuming food and beverages containing saccharin and caffeine .. " Id. at 858 (footnotes omitted).
87 See Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 201, 447 A.2d 539,
545 (1982). The Beshada court specifically stated that:
For purposes of analysis, we can distinguish two tests for determining
whether a product is safe: (1) does its utility outweigh its risk? and (2) if
so, has that risk been reduced to the greatest extent possible consistent
with the product's utility? The first question looks to the product as it
was in fact marketed. If that product caused more harm than good, it
was not reasonably fit for its intended purposes. We can therefore impose strict liability for the injuries it caused without having to determine
whether it could have been rendered safer.
Id. (citation omitted).
88 See id.

89 See id. The Beshada court also noted that
"[t]he second aspect of strict liability, however, requires that the risk
from the product be reduced to the greatest extent possible without hindering its utility. Whether or not the product passes the initial risk-utility test, it is not reasonably safe if the same product could have been
made or marketed more safely.
Warning cases are of this second type. When plaintiffs urge that a
product is hazardous because it lacks a warning, they typically look to
the second test, saying in effect that regardless of the overall cost-benefit calculation the product is unsafe because a warning could make it
safer at virtually no added cost and without limiting its utility. Freund
recognized this, noting that in cases alleging "an inadequate warning as
to safe use, the utility of the product, as counter-balanced against the
risks of its use, is rarely at issue."
Id. at 201-02, 447 A.2d at 545 (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted).
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the user with adequate warnings of the product's potential risks,
thereby preventing him from using the product safely.9 0 Products
in the last subcategory, unavoidably unsafe products, may also be
found defective, even when their benefits outweigh their harm, if the
manufacturer fails to provide sufficient information to permit consumers to make an informed decision concerning the risks of using
the products.9 A clear delineation between these various types of
defects must be made because the risk utility analysis employed will
vary significantly depending upon the category in which the product
falls.
The threshold question that must be resolved, regardless of the
type of product or the nature of the design defect, is whether the
product's risks outweigh its benefits.92 If the product fails this preliminary test, it is defective. 9" Such a product is deemed to be so
dangerous and of such little value to society that it should not be
marketed at all, and its manufacturer should, as a matter of policy,
pay the costs of the injuries.9 4
When a product falling in the first two subcategories passes the
threshold risk benefit test, a further analysis using the relevant
Wade factors must be performed.9 5 As a practical matter, most of
these design defect cases presuppose that the product satisfies the
initial risk benefit test. 96 For example, it is presumed that products
90 See Freund v. Cellofilm Properties Inc., 87 N.J. 229, 242-43, 432 A.2d 925,
932 (1981). In Freund, the plaintiff alleged that the manufacturer of a highly flammable chemical which was used to mix paints and lacquers failed to provide adequate warning as to how to use the product without causing a fire and resulting
burns. Id. at 233-34, 432 A.2d at 927. The Freund court noted that "[a] products
liability charge in an inadequate warning case must focus on safety and emphasize
that a manufacturer, in marketing a product with an inadequate warning as to its
dangers, has not satisfied its duty to warn, even if the product is perfectly inspected,
designed, and manufactured." Id. at 242-43, 432 A.2d at 932.
91 See Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 448, 479 A.2d 374, 384
(1984) (citing Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability, supra note 24, at 745).
92 Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 NJ. 191, 199-202, 447 A.2d 539,
544-45.
93 See id.
94 See, e.g., Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability, supra note 24, at 740, 742 ("If
the design cannot feasibly be made safer, actionability depends on whether the danger is so great that the product should not have been put on the market at all.").
95 See Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 76 N.J. 152, 173-75, 386 A.2d 816, 82627 (1978), rev'd in part, 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979).
96 See Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc., 87 N.J. 229, 238 n.1, 432 A.2d 925,
930 n. I (1981). Relying on its decision in Suter, the court noted that "in the instruction or warning situation, safety is the predominant factor in determining the adequacy of the manufacturer's efforts." Id. at 242, 432 A.2d at 932. This is because
"where the design defect consists of an inadequate warning as to safe use, the utility of the product, as counterbalanced against the risks of its use, is rarely at issue."
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such as electric blenders, injection molding machines, and
automobiles have benefits that outweigh their risks. A proper warn97
ing would have very little effect on the utility of such a product.

Therefore, whether a product in one of the first two subcategories
will be considered defective depends upon an analysis of factors
such as: the manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character
of the product by alternate design or warning, without impairing its
usefulness; the user's ability to avoid the danger by exercise of due
care; the user's awareness of dangers inherent in the product and
their avoidability; and the likelihood and magnitude of the injury the
product will cause.9 8 Implicit in this balancing test is the question of
whether the manufacturer has reduced the danger or risk to the
greatest degree feasible. 99 A product's failure to survive scrutiny
under this analysis renders it defective. Conversely, if it passes, then
the product is duly safe and liability will not attach.
An example of a product for which an alternative safer design
exists is a lawnmower. It could be alleged that a lawnmower, a
product whose benefits presumably outweigh its risks, is defectively
designed because of the absence of a "dead man's" control. In such
a case, the product's overall benefits verses risks would not be challenged.' 0 0 Rather, evidence would be offered to establish the existence of a safer substitute design including a safety device, the
manufacturer's ability to incorporate the device without impairing
the lawnmower's usefulness or making it too expensive, and the
likelihood that the lawnmower, absent the control, would cause a
serious injury. 0 '
A lawnmower might also be defective because of the user's inability to operate it safely in the absence of instructions or adequate
warnings. Again, the usefulness of lawnmowers will not be challenged. Instead, the proofs would focus on the absence of warnings
that would have allowed the user to avoid the dangers attendant to
the use of the product. 0 2 Courts may also consider factors such as
Id.; see also Beshada; 90 N.J. at 201, 447 A.2d at 545 ("whether or not the product
passes the initial risk-utility test, it is not reasonably safe if the same product could

have been made or marketed more safely"). (footnote omitted).
97 Freund, 87 NJ. at 238 n.1, 432 A.2d at 930 n. 1.
98 See supra note 31 and accompanying text (list of Wade factors). See also Cepeda,
76 N.J. at 174, 386 A.2d at 826-27.
99 Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 NJ. 150, 171-72, 406 A.2d 140,
150-51 (1979).
100 Beshada, 90 N.J. at 201, 447 A.2d at 545.

101 See supra note 31 and accompanying text (for discussion of Wade factors (2),
(3) and (4)).
102

Beshada, 90 N.J. at 201, 447 A.2d at 545.
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the user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the use
of the lawnmower and their avoidability because of the obvious condition of the product.' 0 3 Usually, the addition of warnings or instructions regarding the safe operation of the product will not
impair the usefulness of the product and, therefore, the absence of
this information may render the product defective.' °4 The absence
of warnings or instructions, however, will not necessarily render a
product defective as a matter of law. For example, a knife has no
instructions or warnings advising the user to avoid contact with the
sharpened blade. In this instance, however, the product is not defective since the danger is obvious and the user can avoid the dan0 5
gers by exercising due care.1
The determination of defects in products that are unavoidably
unsafe even when used as intended is more limited than for products in subcategories (1) and (2). In this type of case, the product is
more likely to be challenged on the ground that the risks of use outweigh the benefits of the product. 10 6 This is so because a higher
level of initial scrutiny is required for products that carry inherent
See supra note 31 and accompanying text (for discussion of Wade factor (6)).
"Warnings are like seatbelts: regardless of the utility and risk of a product
without warnings, a warning can generally be added without diminishing utility."
Beshada, 90 N.J. at 201 n.5, 447 A.2d at 545 n.5. "In- the case of a design defect
consisting of an inadequate warning. . .imposing the requirements of a proper
warning will seldom detract from the utility of the product." Freund v. Cellofilm
Properties, Inc., 87 N.J. 229, 238 n.1, 432 A.2d 925, 930 n.1 (1981).
105 See Campos v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 98 N.J. 198, 206, 485 A.2d 305,
309 (1984). The court recognized that "[i]f the use of the product is beyond its
intended or reasonably anticipated scope... there may be no duty to warn .... Thus
the manufacturer of a knife is not chargeable with a failure to warn that the knife is
sharp and should not be used as a toothpick." Id. (citation omitted); but cf. Wade,
Nature of Strict Tort Liability, supra note 1, at 842. The court thus reasoned:
We turn next to consider whether a duty to warn exists when the danger
is obvious. Although some jurisdictions have adopted an "obvious danger rule" that would absolve a manufacturer of a duty to warn of dangers that are objectively apparent in our state the obviousness of a
danger, as distinguished from a plaintiff's subjective knowledge of a
danger, is merely one element to be factored into the analysis to determine whether a duty to warn exists. A manufacturer is not automatically
relieved of his duty to warn merely because the danger is patent.
Campos, 98 N.J. at 207, 485 A.2d at 309-10 (citations omitted). See also Schipper v.
Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 81, 207 A.2d 314, 320 (1965) (stating that knowledge of danger would not necessarily, as a matter of law, bar recovery in negligence
action).
106 See Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1274 (5th Cir. 1974). The
court stated that "[u]navoidably unsafe product[s] always present at least a minimal
danger of harm, but only if the potential harmful effects of the product.. .outweigh
the legitimate public interest in its availability will it be declared unreasonably dangerous per se and the person placing it on the market held liable." Id. (footnote
omitted).
103
104
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10 7
risks of harm to all users.
Initially, a determination of defect will be made by simply balancing the product's harm against its benefit. Whether this is characterized as a separate test or simply an application of the first two
Wade factors is immaterial. In most instances, only the first two factors will be considered because the remaining factors are inapplica0
ble.0'
For example, factor four, the manufacturer's ability to
eliminate the product's unsafe characteristic, is by definition inapplicable to unavoidably unsafe products. Factors five and six, the
user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of due care and the
user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product
and their avoidability, cannot be considered since the product under
examination is one whose dangers cannot be avoided, regardless of
the user's knowledge. Therefore, consumer knowledge and behavior is irrelevant to the issue of defectiveness under a risk utility analysis applied to an unavoidably unsafe product which is used as
intended.' 0 9
Assuming the unavoidably unsafe product survives the initial
risk benefit examination, the next question is whether the manufacturer provided the user with information sufficient to permit him to
consent to the product's inherent risks.IO If the manufacturer

See O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 N.J. 169, 183, 463 A.2d 298, 305 (1983).
Factor 3, "the availability of a substitute product which would meet some
needs and not be unsafe" does not apply to the initial risk utility analysis. It is very
similar to the second prong of the test for strict liability outlined in Beshada-has
the product's risk been reduced to the greatest extent possible consistent with its
utility-and comes into play only after an initial determination regarding risk utility
has been made. As such, Factor 3 is basically incorporated into the Beshada test and
therefore there is no need for a separate analysis of this factor. The availability, or
lack thereof, of a safer substitute product does not affect the product's benefits nor
its risks. The absence of a safer substitute product would only mitigate against the
imposition of liability if the trier of fact first concludes that the use of the product in
question produces a tolerable benefit-harm ratio.
109 O'Brien, 94 N.J. at 186, 463 A.2d at 307. In O'Brien, the majority of the New
Jersey Supreme Court noted that:
Justice Schreiber [concurring and dissenting] would find that no matter
how dangerous a product may be, if it bears an adequate warning, it is
free from design defects if there is no known alternative. Under that
hypothesis, manufacturers, merely by placing warnings on their products, could insulate themselves from liability regardless of the number
of people those products maim or kill. By contrast, the majority concludes that the judicial, not the commercial, system is the appropriate
forum for determining whether a product is defective with the resultant
imposition of strict liability upon those in the commercial chain.
Id.
110 Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability, supra note 24, at 745-46.
Most products cannot be made completely safe. Some carry real
dangers, but their utility is so much greater than their danger that they
107
108
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failed to provide such information, the product will be considered
defective."' On the other hand, an adequate warning as to these
dangers will insulate the manufacturer from strict liability since the
user would have assumed those risks as a matter of law.' 12
Unavoidably unsafe products are common in the area of pharmaceutical drugs which, often carry risks of harmful side effects even
when used as intended."' Justification for marketing these drugs is
based on the significant benefits they provide in curing and preventing certain diseases.' 14 For example, the polio vaccine carries a cerare not held to be actionable. And yet they should be made as safe as is
feasible. If a product cannot be made completely safe from a physical
standpoint, it may be that a warning will make it safer to the point that it
may be found to be not actionable.
A warning can prevent a product from being characterized as unreasonably dangerous in two types of situations: (1) the product produces a danger that can be avoided by the user if he is alerted to it and
instructed how to avoid it, and (2) the product creates a danger that
cannot be eliminated, but its utility is so great that it may be marketed
without subjecting the manufacturer to liability, provided the user is made
aware of the danger and is given the opportunity to make an informed decision
whether to expose himself to it....
As for the second situation, ... [i]f the danger is unavoidable in the
sense that it cannot be physically eliminated, the legal effect of a warning that provides the user with an opportunity to determine whether to
subject himself to the danger depends upon the closeness of the balance
between the risk and utility of the product. If the utility and the risk are
fairly equally balanced, the warning may tip the Icales on the side of
utility. But if the risk is distinctly greater, the use of a warning will make no
difference, and the product should not be put on the market at all. Calling the risk
unavoidable cannot be a talisman to change this result.
Id. (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
I' I d.
112 See Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 447-49, 479 A.2d 374, 38384 (1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment k (1965).
113 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment k (1965); see supra note
70 for text of comment k; see also Feldman, 97 N.J. at 447, 479 A.2d at 383.
114 See Keeton, Products Liability-Some Observations, supra note 1, at 1347.
It is at least arguable that, in the absence of a miscarriage in the manufacturing process, the maker of a drug, especially one designed to save
lives, should not be subjected to liability for the consequences to those
who are harmed by its use, even if the drug, after an experimental period, is subsequently withdrawn from the market as an unreasonably
dangerous product. Such an imposition of liability could produce socially undesirable results by discouraging the development of new
drugs, and there may be better ways for society to compensate those
who are injured during the experimental period. On the other hand,
enterprisers engaged in distributing non-essential products like cosmetics may well be expected to bear the risks of any scientifically undiscoverable dangers that are ultimately the cause of the product's being
withdrawn form the market.
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tain percentage of morbidity and mortality, but in the overwhelming
number of cases, it prevents the disease. Thus, the benefit of the
product may be considered to outweigh the risk. Therefore, the
manufacturer of such a product will not be strictly liable if adequate
warnings accompany its product.
A significant factor to consider in resolving any risk benefit
analysis is whether the product is a necessity, a luxury, or a leisure
item. 15 Where the product falls on this continuum has to be considered in assessing how much greater the benefits must be than the
risks before the product should be deemed defective.' 1 6 When performing a risk utility test, the fact that a product is a necessity should
require less proof of its benefits than for luxury or leisure items.
The further one proceeds toward the luxury end of the line, the
greater the benefit must be in order for the product to survive the
scrutiny of the risk-utility framework.'' 7
B.

Consumer Knowledge and Behavior

Once it has been determined that an unavoidably unsafe
product fails the risk benefit analysis, the question arises as to
what, if any, effect consumer knowledge and behavior have on
the issues of defect and comparative fault. As previously indicated, consumer knowledge regarding a product's hazards is irrelevant to the determination of the defect of an unavoidably
unsafe product." 8 The reason for this is the user's inability to
avoid the product's dangers, no matter how much he knows, and
no matter how he uses the product. Unfortunately, many commentators have failed to distinguish between avoidable and una115 See O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 N.J. 169, 184, 463 A.2d 298, 306 (1983).
"The evaluation of the utility of a product also involves the relative need for that
product; some products are essentials, while others are luxuries. A product that
fills a critical need and can be designed in only one way should be viewed differently from a luxury item." Id. See also supra note 114 and accompanying text (for a
discussion of the differences in liability between manufacturing necessities and luxury items).
116 See O'Brien, 94 N.J. at 183, 463 A.2d at 305. "Where a particular product falls
on the risk-utility continuum will depend on the facts of each case. A toy that poses
undue risks to infants may be viewed differently from therapeutic device that protects or prolongs life." Id.
117 See Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984). In Ferebee, the court noted that geography may also play a part in the jury's balancing of a
product's risks and benefits (in this case paraquat). The court suggested that a jury
in an agricultural state that used paraquat extensively may consider the product
highly beneficial, while ajury in a state with limited agricultural industry might view
the product less favorably. Id. at 1540.
118 See supra note 109 and accompanying text (for a discussion of this
proposition).
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voidable risks in discussing the role of a consumer's knowledge
in the determination of defect.' ' 9 This has often resulted in the
conclusion that a consumer's appreciation of a product's dangers, regardless of their avoidability, mitigates in favor of finding
the product not defective. 20 The misconception in this conclusion becomes apparent in the following illustration. A consumer's awareness that a knife is sharp or that. a speeding
automobile is dangerous allows him to use the product safely by
avoiding the knife's cutting edge or by driving within the speed
limit. A smoker's awareness that smoking causes lung cancer,
however, does not allow him to use the product in such a way as
to avoid the risk. 12 In this latter instance, the only way to
"avoid" the product's risk is not to use the product at all.
The more complex issue is whether consumer behavior and
knowledge should result in a finding of comparative fault. When
an unavoidably unsafe product is used as intended and fails the
initial risk benefit inquiry, it is illogical and unsupportable to conclude that the consumer's proper use of the product results in
comparative fault. 1 2 2 To permit a consumer's knowledge to be
119 See, e.g., Page, Generic Product Risks, supra note 18, at 887-88.
The policy of satisfying justifiable consumer expectations also dictates
the refusal to impose strict liability for harm from known generic risks.
The ordinary consumer appreciates the danger posed by a speeding automobile or a sharp knife, and would therefore have no cause to believe
that a manufacturer would do more than use due care to reduce these
hazards. Contemporary smokers know of the risk of cancer from cigarettes. The presence of warnings on the label of prescription drugs
makes physicians, acting on their patients' behalves, aware of the relevant risks. In each of these cases, consumers can make a rational judgment about the scope of the hazard and act accordingly.
Id.
120 See id.
121 Former California Chief Justice Traynor has stated that
[t]he now patent risks of cigarettes are not comparable to those of,
say, matches or knives....
The cigarette cases illustrate the difficulties presented by the definition of defect in terms of deviation from common expectation. One of
the purposes of the test [Restatement (Second) § 402A] is to exclude
liability for the harmful effects of smoking .... Given the habit forming
nature of cigarettes, it is questionable how voluntarily many consumers
are continuing to smoke. Moreover, there are no warnings on cigarette
packages of a sort to bring home the gravity of the risk. Important
though it may be to scrutinize one man's meat for signs of nonconforming poison, it may more often prove necessary to scrutinize his conforming poison for signs of warning as to its use and even reminders as
to its patent risks.
Traynor, The Ways and Meanings, supra note 1, at 370-71.
122 See Marschall, An Obvious Wrong Does Not Make a Right: Manufacturers' Liability
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asserted as a defense when the court has determined that such
knowledge does not affect the issue of defect would undermine
the basic premise that some "products, including some for which
no alternative exists, are so dangerous and of such little use that
under the risk-utility analysis, a manufacturer would bear the cost
of liability of harm to others. That cost might dissuade a manu2
facturer from placing the product on the market."' 1
To elevate the mere purchase and intended use of a legal
product to the level of an unreasonable and voluntary assumption of a known danger, resulting in comparative fault, is inconsistent with accepted notions of strict liability. 124 For a
manufacturer to suggest otherwise, however, would be tantamount to conceding that a reasonably prudent person would not
purchase or use its product. Implicit in this position is the corollary that a reasonably prudent manufacturer would not have sold
the product. In other words, to say it is unreasonable to buy such
a product is to say it is unreasonable to sell it.
In the context of an unavoidably unsafe product that passes
the initial risk benefit analysis, consumer knowledge is relevant to
the issue of informed consent. 1 25 The very purpose of providing
for Patently Dangerous Products, 48 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1065, 1088 (1973) ("[ojnce it is
established that the defendant has a duty to protect persons from the consequences
of their own foreseeable faulty conduct, it makes no sense to deny recovery because
of the nature of the plaintiff's conduct."); see also Green v. Sterling Extruder Corp.,
95 N.J. 263, 471 A.2d 15 (1984) (factory worker's contributory negligence not
available as a defense to manufacturer); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co.,
81 N.J. 150, 167, 406 A.2d 140, 148 (1979) ("The imposition of a duty on the
manufacturer to make the machine safe... means that the law does not accept the
employee's ability to take care of himself as an adequate safeguard of interests
which society seeks to protect.").
123 O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 N.J. 169, 184, 298, 306 (1983).
124 See, e.g., Suter, 85 N.J. at 166-67, 406 A.2d at 148. Quoting Bexiga, the court
noted that the negligence of the plaintiff "was the 'very eventuality the safety devices were designed to guard against.' " The court also stated "that '[i]t would be
anomalous to hold that defendant has a duty to install safety devices but a breach of
that duty results in no liability for the very injury the duty was meant to protect
against.' " Id. (quoting Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 60 N.J. 402, 412, 290 A.2d 281,
286 (1972)). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment n ("If the
user or consumer discovers the defect and is aware of the danger, and nevertheless
proceeds unreasonably to make use of the product and is injured by it, he is barred
from recovery."). But cf. Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g. Co., 76 N.J. 152, 189-90,
386 A.2d 816, 834 (1978), rev'd in part, 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979) (The use
of unreasonable and voluntary assumption of a known hazard as a defense "seems a
fair balance of justice and policy" in the area of strict product liability).
125 See Cepeda, 76 N.J. at 185, 386 A.2d at 823. The Cepeda court noted that "[ilt is
implicit in comment n that only a limited range of a plaintiff's conduct-not contributory negligence in the sense of mere carelessness or inadvertence-can be a
defense to an action for strict liability in tort for injuries sustained as the result of a
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a warning to the user of such a product is to enable him to balance the product's dangers against its benefits, and then to make
an informed decision whether to use the product or not. The
presence of an adequate warning will avoid a finding that the
product is defective.' 2 6 If, however, the warning is inadequate,
the product may be considered defective. 12 7 Even if the warning
is adequate, consumer knowledge may be relevant on the issue of
28
proximate cause. 1
In certain instances a "consumer expectation" test may serve
as the basis for imposing strict liability.' 29 The "consumer expectation" test adopted in New Jersey is applied only where the
user anticipated that the product would perform in a safe manner
and it did not.1 30 In the context of an unavoidably unsafe prodproduct defect .. " Id. In addressing the applicability of the contributory negligence defense under comment n, the court stated that
Contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense when such negligence consists merely in a failure to discover the defect in the product,
or to guard against the possibility of its existence. On the other hand
the form of contributory negligence which consists in voluntarily and
unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger, and commonly
passes under the name of assumption of risk, is a defense under this
Section as in other cases of strict liability. If the user or consumer discovers the defect and is aware of the danger, and nevertheless proceeds
unreasonably to make use of the product and is injured by it, he is
barred from recovery.
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment n).
126 O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 N.J. 169, 183, 463 A.2d 298, 305 (1983).
"[S]ome products are unavoidably unsafe: the need for a product may be great, but
the existing state of human knowledge may not make it safe ....With those products, the determination of liability may be achieved more appropriately through an
evaluation of the adequacy of the warnings." Id.
127 Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 447-48, 479 A.2d 374, 383-84
(1984) (citations omitted).
128 Campos v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 98 N.J. 198, 209, 485 A.2d 305, 311
(1984) (where court indicated that consumer's knowledge of danger might invalidate a claim that lack of warning caused plaintiff's resulting injury).
129 See supra note 25 (for an explanation of liability under the "consumer expectation" test). In a "consumer expectation" test, the consumer shows that the product's performance failed to meet the ordinary consumer expectations "when used
in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner." Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20
Cal. 3d 413, 429, 573 P.2d 443, 454, 143 Cal.Rptr. 225, 236 (1978).
130 Suter, 81 N.J. at 150, 406 A.2d at 140. The court noted:
In some improper design situations the nature of the proofs will be the
same as in other unintended defect cases. This occurs when it is selfevident that the product is not reasonably suitable and safe and fails to
perform, contrary to the user's reasonable expectation that it would
safely do the jobs for which it was built.
Id. at 170-71, 406 A.2d at 150 (quoting Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods. Inc., 59
Cal. 2d 57, 64, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963)). It has been
suggested that a consumer's expectation should govern the resolution of the issue
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uct, a consumer's awareness of the product's potential dangers
does not restrict the test of defect to "consumer expectations,"
but rather, invokes the broader balancing test of the risk-benefit
analysis. 131
C. Judge's Role versus Jury's Role in Risk Utility Analysis.

Both the court and the jury play a significant role in determining the issue of defect. Their respective responsibilities are
dependent in large measure on the nature of the defect and the
degree of disparity between the product's risks and benefits. In
the first instance, if reasonable minds could not differ that the
product's risks exceed its benefits, then the court would, as a
matter of law, determine the product to be defective.1 32 This is
so regardless of whether the product is or is not unavoidably unsafe. In the case of an unavoidably unsafe product, where the
court determines that the product's benefits outweigh its risks,
however, the jury would simply determine whether the consumer
was provided with an adequate warning of those unavoidable
risks.' 33 Conversely, if the court decides that fact questions exist
as to whether the product's risks outweigh its benefits, the ques34
tion will be resolved by the trier of fact.'
When confronted with a design defect that the manufacturer
could rectify, the court will apply a more expansive risk utility
analysis. 135 If, after this analysis, the court determines that reasonable minds could not differ in finding that the product's utility
outweighs its risks, judgment would be entered in favor of the
manufacturer. 136 If reasonable minds could differ, then the court
would permit the jury to decide the question of defect with apof defect where the product is unavoidably unsafe. Although the New Jersey
Supreme Court has apparently recognized that a defect may be proven by a product's failure to comport with consumer expectation, it has done so by noting that
such a test is the "floor" not the "ceiling" for imposition of strict liability. Id. at
187, 406 A.2d at 159 (Clifford, J., concurring).
11 See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 664, 670 n.2 (D.N.J. 1986),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 907 (1987)(citation omitted).
132 O'Brien, 94 N.J. at 169, 463 A.2d at 298. "If the minds of reasonable men
could not differ on whether the risks posed by a product outweigh its utility, or vice
versa, then the court could make the appropriate determination as a matter of
law .... If, however, there is a fact question whether the risks outweigh the utility of
the product, then the matter is for the trier of fact." Id. at 186, 463 A.2d at 307
(citation omitted).
1 3 See id.
34 Id.
135 See supra notes 92-105 and accompanying text.
136 See O'Brien, 94 N.J. at 186, 463 A.2d at 307.
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propriate instructions.17 In the event that the court concludes
that reasonable minds could not differ that the product's risks
outweigh the product's utility, it would enter a judgment declaring the product defective, thus removing the case from the deci13 8
sionmaking process of the jury.

What the jury is instructed concerning the risk utility factors,
or the issue of defect, depends in large measure on the nature of
the defect in question. In most circumstances, the court will
charge the jury that a product is defective if the product "is so
likely to be harmful to persons... that a reasonable prudent manufacturer. . ., who had actual knowledge of its harmful character

would not place it on the market."' 3 9 If the court decides that
specific Wade factors are highly relevant to a determination of
defect, then the court will instruct the jury on those particular
factors.140 For example, with an unavoidably unsafe product that
is used as intended, the court would charge the jury as follows: if
the product is found to be so dangerous that its risks outweigh its
benefits, it should not be marketed
at all, despite the obviousness
41
of the product's danger.
IV.

JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF RISK UTILITY ANALYSIS TO
UNAVOIDABLY

UNSAFE

PRODUCTS

Because so few unavoidably unsafe products exist that result
in more harm than good, and because of the Bar's failure to advocate the imposition of liability based on a risk utility test, the
courts have had few opportunities to consider the applicability of
the risk utility test to the determination of defect for such
products.
Recently, two New Jersey courts have decided this issue in
the context of cigarette litigation. 42 In Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
Inc., 4' the District Court of New Jersey specifically declared viable the plaintiff's claim "that whether or not a safer design was
possible, cigarettes as currently designed are 'unreasonably un137 See id. (citation omitted).
138 See id (citation omitted).
139 Wade, Nature of Strict Tort Liability, supra note 1, at 839-40. See also Feldman v.
Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 451, 479 A.2d 374, 385-86 (1984) (discussing
when a product is considered defective).
140 Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., Inc., 76 N.J. 152, 174-75, 386 A.2d 816,
827 (1978), overruled iii part, 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979).
141 See Wade, Nature of Strict Tort Liability, supra note 1, at 840-4 1.
142 See infra notes 142-152 and accompanying text.
143 649 F. Supp. 664 (D.N.J. 1986).
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safe' under the 'risk utility' analysis promoted by Dean Wade and
adopted by the NewJersey Supreme Court."' 4 4 After noting that
the risk utility theory advocates the marketing of safe products
only,' 4 5 the court held that a claim based on a simple risk benefit
analysis may be pursued even if the product is unavoidably unsafe.' 4 6 Furthermore, the court noted that the first prong of the
risk utility analysis does not encompass a consideration of the adequacy of the warning labels since that issue is reached only if the
product's benefits are deemed to outweigh its risks.' 4 7 The court
reiterated that some products, including those for which no alternative design exists, "are so dangerous and of such little use that
under the risk benefit analysis
a manufacturer" should bear the
14 8
cost of harm to others.
More recently, in Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. ,'49 a New

Jersey trial court recognized that a "determination of the existence of a defect is a function of the judicial, rather than the commercial, system."'"5 The court held that a claim that cigarettes
are defective because they present risks that outweigh their benefits could be pursued, regardless of the adequacy of cigarette
15
warnings or the availability of a safer design for cigarettes. '
Id. at 669-70 (citations omitted).
Id. at 669 (quoting Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 200,
447 A.2d 539, 544 (1982)).
146 Id. at 669-71.
147 Id. at 671.
148 Id. (quoting O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 N.J. 169, 184, 463 A.2d 298, 306
(1983)). See also Cipollone v. Liggett, 644 F. Supp. 283, 288 (D.N.J. 1986) where
Judge Sarokin stated that
[n]otwithstanding defendants' attempts to extract such a meaning by
means of selective citation, the New Jersey Supreme Court's decisions
have never said that a product's utility may be established by looking to
whether the defendant "reasonably" believed that its profits would be
sufficient to maintain a livelihood, hire employees, or pay taxes by operating the company that placed a product on the market.
The New Jersey Supreme Court's silence in this regard becomes all
the more deafening upon an inspection of the principles underlying
strict liability theory. Defendants' proposed evidence, when distilled to
its essence, aims to establish their product is profitable, that some of
those profits are disseminated to others in society, and that such benefits would be reduced or eliminated if liability were imposed. But strict
liability law is, if anything, intended to temper the profit motive by making a manufacturer or marketer aware that it may be less costly in the
long run to market a product more safely, or not to market it at all.
Id.(citation omitted) (footnote omitted).
4'- Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 216 N.J. Super. 347, 523 A.2d 712 (Law
Div. 1986).
150 Id. (citation omitted).
144

145

'5

Id.
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Following the dictates of O'Brien, the court stated that a manufacturer cannot insulate itself from liability under all circumstances
merely by placing warnings on its products. Accordingly, the
court affirmed that the "risk utility analysis is the proper standard
for evaluating... the claim that cigarettes are defective."152

In the context of an asbestos case, the Supreme Court of
Louisiana held in Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. '13 that a
product is defective per se if a reasonable person would conclude
that the dangers attendant to the use of the product, whether or
not foreseeable, outweigh the product's utility.' 5 4 The court rec-

ognized this to be the "purest form of strict liability," and held
that liability can be imposed solely upon the basis of the products' intrinsic characteristics, irrespective of the manufacturer's
knowledge, intent, or conduct.' 55
The view that the risk utility analysis should be applied in
determining the issue of defect involving unavoidably unsafe
products has not been uniformly adopted. For example, in deciding whether a handgun should be subjected to a risk utility
analysis, a Texas federal district court in Patterson v. Gesellschaft ,56

held that to do so would pervert the purpose of the risk utility
balancing test as employed in Texas products liability cases. 5 '
The court concluded that the risk utility test incorporates the theory that a defect must be something that can be changed or remedied. Accordingly, the court held that the very facts that the
jury is supposed to review when weighing risk and utility include
the cost and feasibility of an improved design.' 58
The Patterson court's logic is flawed in two respects. First,
the court assumed that all the risk utility factors proposed by
59
Dean Wade must be implicated in every risk utility analysis;'
and second, it presumed that the fact that handguns can be used
illegally in some way exempts them from the risk utility analysis. 160 The real issue, in assessing whether or not the product is
defective, should have been whether handguns, when used in the
152 Id.

153 484 So. 2d 110 (La. 1986) (en banc) (on certification from Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals, 755 F.2d 393 (1985) to decide a question of Louisiana law).
'54 Id. at 114.
'55 Id. at 113-14.
156 608 F. Supp. 1206 (N.D. Tex. 1985).
157 Id. at 1212.
158 Id.
5,) See id. at 1210-12.
160 See id at 1212-13.
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manner intended by the manufacturer, 1 61 present risks to both
the user and society that outweigh their benefits.
Following the reasoning in Patterson, the Maryland Court of
Appeals in Kelley v. R. G. Industries162 held that the risk utility analysis is inappropriate to resolve the issue of defect of a handgun
that functioned as intended.1 6 ' The court concluded that the risk
utility analysis should apply only "when something goes wrong
with a product."' 64 The court felt compelled, however, to create
a unique form of liability for "Saturday night special" handguns.
The court reasoned that the law of strict liability is fluid and must
165
change to fit the circumstances of a particular case in question,
form of liability is consistent with the state's
and that this unique
66
public policy. 1

The only apparent difference between the "handgun" and
the "cigarette" and "asbestos" cases is whether the product is
susceptible to misuse or illegal use. One may argue that the
harm resulting from the illegal use of a product should not be
considered in the risk benefit equation. This rationale, however,
requires a distinction without a difference-illegal use versus
foreseeable misuse.' 6 7 Whether a product may be misused, illegally or otherwise, should not exempt it from risk utility
Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 159, 406 A.2d 140,
144 (1979) ("In other words, plaintiff's misuse of the product sheds no light on
whether the product is reasonably fit and safe for its intended or reasonably anticipated use.").
162 304 Md. 124, 497 A.2d 1143 (1985).
163 Id. at 138, 497 A.2d at 1149. The court noted, however, that no previous
decision of the Court of Appeals had ever expressly rested upon an analysis under
the risk utility test. Id. at 137, 497 A.2d at 1149. The court also declined to apply
the consumer expectation test to handguns. Id. at 135-36, 497 A.2d at 1148.
164 Id. at 138, 497 A.2d at 1149.
165 See id. at 140, 497 A.2d at 1150-51.
166 Id. at 144, 497 A.2d at 1152-53. Although the court professed not to be applying risk-utility test in concluding that strict liability should be imposed, its holding was premised on the fact that the product in question "presents particular
problems for law enforcement officials." Id. at 144-45, 497 A.2d at 1153-54 (footnote omitted). Saturday Night Specials are generally characterized by short barrels,
light weight, easy concealability, low cost, use of cheap quality materials, poor manufacture, inaccuracy and unreliability." Id. at 145-46, 497 A.2d at 1153-54. "[T]he
Saturday Night Special [is] particularly attractive for criminal use and virtually useless for the legitimate purposes of law enforcement, sport, and protection of persons, property and businesses." Id. at 146, 497 A.2d at 1154 (footnote omitted).
167 See Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140
(1979). "Fitness and suitability are terms largely synonymous with safety. Cepeda
extended strict liability to include not only intended but also reasonably foreseeable uses of the product." Id. at 169, 406 A.2d at 149. In Cepeda v.Cumberland
Eng'g. Co., 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816 (1978), the court noted that
abnormal use is not an affirmative defense; it is rather for the plaintiff, in
161
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scrutiny. 168
V.

CONCLUSION

It is apparent that some courts continue to grapple with the
scope of the risk utility analysis and its applicability to certain
classes of products. This is due to their misunderstanding of or
unfamiliarity with the test and to the far reaching ramifications of
a finding that a particular class of products has greater risks than
benefits.
This article suggests what should happen when the courts are
finally confronted with the unavoidably unsafe product that,
when used as intended, results in more harm than good.
Whether the judiciary will stand behind its professed philosophy
that such a product should not be marketed and that the manufacturer should bear the costs of injury remains to be seen. But it
is clear that if the courts mean what they say, their oft-expressed
concerns for the victimized consumer will be accommodated
through the application of the risk utility test.
undertaking to prove that the unreasonable dangerousness of the article
caused the injury, to show there was no abnormal use.
It is, however, clear that many, if not most jurisdictions now acknowledge that in applying strict liability in tort for design defects manufacturers cannot escape liability on grounds of misuse or abnormal use
if the actual use proximate to the injury was objectively foreseeable.

Id. at 177, 386 A.2d at 828 (citations omitted).
168 See Suter, 81 N.J. at 105, 406 A.2d 140. The court summarized "[t]he principle

of strict liability" as follows:
If at the time the seller distributes a product, it is not reasonably fit,
suitable and safe for its intended or reasonably foreseeable purposes so
that users or others who may be expected to come in contact with the
product are injured as a result thereof, then the seller shall be responsi-

ble for the ensuing damages.
Id. at 169, 406 A.2d at 149 (footnote omitted).

